What conditions may foster an industrial development strategy based on extractive industries? by Mancini, Lorenzo & Paz Antolín, María José
1 
 
What Conditions May Foster an Industrial Development Strategy from 
Extractive Industries? 
 
Mancini, L. 
Paz, María J. mjpazant@ucm.es 
 
Abstract. Our work provides a selective survey of the literature on the relation between 
natural resources and industrialization, with a focus on extractive industries. The paper 
consists of three sections. First, it discusses the main problems identified by the scholars 
in relation to the abundance of natural resources. Second, it addresses two dimensions of 
the nexus between natural resources and industrial development: a fiscal one and a 
productive one. Third, it critically examines the two dimensions in order to find the 
conditions needed to set up a strategy of industrial development applicable to the 
extractive industries. Then, it briefly discusses some relevant issues partially neglected in 
early literature, and then suggests insights for further research. 
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1. Introduction 
The influence of an endowment of natural resources (NR hereafter) in shaping the 
economic, social, and political life of countries has been widely debated for decades. 
Recently, new works have emerged questioning the thesis known as resource curse, which 
posits a negative relationship between abundance of NR and country economic 
performance. Countering this argument, many scholars have pointed that this relationship 
is not always negative, whereas the political and institutional framework can be 
determinant. 
Since 2000, the academic debate has gained prominence in a context earmarked by a 
global commodity boom which has also encouraged the proliferation of new economic 
strategies related to the exploitation of NR in developing countries. That has been 
especially the case of extractive industries, which have been strongly affected by rising 
prices and an increased demand during 2000-2014. Though since 2013 the upward trend 
has been reversed and the volatility of prices has increased, the debate over these 
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strategies is still open. That is due to the fact that, alongside the resource boom, two 
factors have contributed to the spreading of such strategies: (1) the difficulty in imitating 
the Asian model of industrialization in African and Latin American developing countries, 
and (2) a critical review of the “Washington Consensus” vis-a-vis a “new” emergent 
consensus that looks more favorably to governmental intervention and industrial policy. 
Given this background, found in both academic and political discourse, we operate 
from a presumption that the resource curse is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Precisely 
for this reason, our work assumes that it is possible to define a strategy of industrial 
development from NR. From here, the paper addresses two research questions, as follows: 
(1) what are the main economic problems that have hindered the industrialization in some 
resource-rich countries? And, taking into account these problems, (2) what conditions 
may foster a strategy of industrial development from NR?  
The purpose of our research is to answer both questions through a critical review of 
the most significant literature on the topic. Our first aim is to synthesize and compare the 
main contributions, thus reflecting the current state of thought on the subject. It must be 
noted that the literature on NR is quite extensive and dispersed across different 
approaches, even within the same line of economic thought. Therefore, the selection of 
references, a key part of this study, has been done with the explicit intention of extracting 
the essential argument of each approach; that is, the most pertinent to the research 
questions.1  
This paper differs from previous researches going beyond a critical review of the 
resource curse literature (Di John, 2011) by interpreting the industrialization as an 
essential (though not unique) part of the economic development. Moreover, while we 
share early contributions on the relevance of domestic policy decisions in determining the 
impact of the exploitation of NR (Saad-Filho and Weeks, 2013), we move further by 
looking into what type of conditions and policies may foster a strategy of industrial 
development in resource-rich developing countries. We argue that sound economic 
policies should take into account both fiscal and productive dimension.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 looks into a critical review of the major 
problems associated with the exploitation of NR. Our findings leads us to distinguish 
                                                          
1 Though our interest is on extractive industries, we are also taking into account references that analyze 
natural resources as a whole, since most of the conclusions are also applicable to the extractive 
industries. Notwithstanding, as we will discuss, when we analyze case studies on specific sectors, our 
review will be focused on extractive industries.  
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three fundamental issues: (1) the macroeconomic problems which adversely affect the 
industrialization (Dutch disease), (2) those aspects associated with rent-seeking, resource 
dependence, and the distribution of incomes generated by the exploitation of NR 
(rentism), and (3) the difficulties to develop linkages with the rest of the economy 
(structuralist concerns).  
 In Section 2, we seek to identify the economic conditions which should be 
considered in a resource-based strategy of industrialization. The various contributions 
have been divided into two main categories: those affecting the productive dimension, 
and those concerning the fiscal dimension. We found a clear complementarity between 
these two dimensions, which is the result of an increasing “dialogue” between neo-
structuralism and neo-institutionalism within the field of development economics. 
Finally, Section 3 summarizes the main points of convergence and disagreement 
among scholars, thereafter synthesizing the answers to the research questions. 
 
2. Problems Related with Natural Resources Exploitation 
 
2.1 Dutch Disease and De-industrialization 
The phenomenon known as the Dutch disease (DD hereafter) is one of the main problems 
which have been associated with the exploitation of NR. In synthetic form, the DD 
suggests that a robust expansion of the aggregate income of the productive factor used in 
the exploitation of energy resources may affect the external competitiveness of other 
tradable sectors (especially the manufacturing and agriculture); it occurs mainly, but not 
exclusively, through an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  
De-industrialization may result as a consequence of two main mechanisms (Corden 
and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984; Krugman, 1987). First, the shrinking of the industry 
occurs directly, since employment, production, and other resources in the economy begin 
to move away from the non-booming tradable sector and become oriented toward the 
resources-intensive industry, assuming that this sector is associated with a relatively 
higher marginal product of labor resulting from the boom (resource movement effect). 
On the other hand, the increase of income generated within the economy leads to an 
appreciation of nominal currency exchange (assuming a positive income elasticity of 
demand for non-tradable products, the prices in this sector should rise relative to the prices 
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of other tradable sectors); moreover, it stimulates the demand for both tradable and non-
tradable products (consumption effect).2  
In addition to these two mechanisms, scholars have also highlighted that the DD may 
debilitate the economic growth because the shrinking in the manufacturing affects a key 
sector of the economy where the learning-by-doing process takes place. Assuming that 
workers can move to the booming energy-intensive sector, the resulting crowding-out of 
their training would result in a progressive erosion of the human capital present in the 
economy (Kim, 1998; Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio, 2005).  
Scholars have further developed the investigation of the DD through the 
incorporation of more sophisticated theoretical models (Bruno and Sachs, 1982). It has 
been taken into account a more proactive role of macroeconomic intervention 
considering, for instance, the introduction of public subsidies to sustain the tradable sector 
negatively affected by the DD (van Wijnbergen, 1984; Gelb et al., 1988; Gylfason, 2001).  
Two critical aspects deserve a special attention. First, the copious research that has 
been developed around the phenomenon of the DD has not reached a wide and robust 
consensus on whether all the mechanisms depicted in the theoretical models will 
ultimately arise and on how they actually interact with each other in a specific economic 
context. Some scholars prefer to stress the currency exchange effects (Caballero and 
Lorenzoni, 2007) whereas they do not reach a conclusive consensus on the empirical 
evidence vis-a-vis the overall impact of the DD, especially in terms of economic growth 
effects through real exchange rate appreciation (Magud and Sosa, 2010).  
The second critical point is the consideration that the economic effects are essentially 
determined by market mechanisms, without taking into proper account the influence of 
the institutional framework and the specific productive structure. Hence, from this relative 
disregard to the institutions and the specific productive structure derives a difficulty of 
pure macroeconomic models to understand and explain why DD materializes in some 
countries but not in others (Smith, 2007),3 and what implications this effect has for 
                                                          
2 Assuming that the price of the former is determined by the international market (earliest models focused 
on small economies), the expansion of the demand may result in an increase of imports. Hence, prices 
in the non-tradable sector increase, as do input costs and wages, ultimately affecting the export 
competitiveness. 
3 Smith (2007) has compared the cases of Iran and Indonesia. He has demonstrated that, though both 
countries began late development in the same period, and the oil and gas industry played a similar role 
in their economies, they experienced different political consequences after the first oil shock. The author 
has argued that preexisting institutions and State-society relations determine different results when an 
oil boom occurs. Indeed, Iran and Indonesia significantly differed both in the context of the onset of late 
development and in the institutional framework prior to the oil boom. Smith (2007) has suggested that 
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developing economies which are still on the path of industrialization or which have not 
been engaged in it yet. Furthermore, the essential theoretical assumptions of the DD 
contradict the experience of those countries in which the investments in human capital 
triggered by the exploitation of NR did contribute to foster industrial development (De 
Ferranti et al., 2002; Wright and Czelusta, 2002). 
Pegg's paper (2010) on Botswana is particularly illustrative of the two critical issues 
noted above. Pegg shows that Botswana “currently suffers from many of the symptoms 
of the Dutch disease […] but not for the causal reasons posited in the Dutch disease 
model” (op.cit. p. 14). The DD symptoms are the result of non-DD factors, particularly 
Botswana’s local circumstances. Moreover, Pegg shows that Botswana has properly 
managed revenues from diamonds but that, despite this, the economy has not diversified. 
In addition, Pegg provides a critical element to the discussion by noting that the debate 
on the DD “might seem superfluous at first glance” (op. Cit 14), taking into account the 
high levels of per capita growth in Botswana for more than three decades. This calls into 
question the notion that the problems associated with DD have been key to many 
resource-rich developing countries. 
 
Fuentes (2009) studied the case of Chile where the exploitation of copper mines is 
open to the private sector but the government has a large participation in the resource 
rents through the State-Owned Enterprise. He suggested that Dutch Disease is not 
inevitable: the Chilean government managed the resource abundance through fiscal 
discipline and the creation of stabilization funds in a context of good institutional 
framework. 
Our critical review suggests that the proper inclusion of a historical and structural 
perspective is desirable, especially considering that a poor competitiveness in the non-
booming tradable sector may be associated not only with a real exchange rate 
appreciation, but also with structural internal deficiencies of a country. Hence, it may be 
useful to study the degree of influence that the domestic manufacturing sector is able to 
exercise on the distribution of rents related to the NR in a way to use them to gain more 
protection from market competition: that would partially attenuate the manifestations of 
the DD. 
 
                                                          
two initial conditions influence the type of government regime: strength of political opposition and 
constraints on patronage rents.  
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2.2 Rentism and the Resource Curse 
In recent decades there has been a proliferation of researches which constitute the body 
of an extensive literature on the phenomenon generally referred to as resource curse 
(Auty, 1994). This issue is not new among scholars: early critics had already stressed key 
problems to foster industrial development in primary economies of the periphery 
(Prebisch, 1950; Nurkse, 1953). Notwithstanding, most recent research (Atkinson and 
Hamilton, 2003; Stevens, 2003; Lederman and Maloney, 2008) tends in some way to refer 
to the seminal work of Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) who have found evidence of an 
overall negative correlation between that abundance of NR - especially in extractive 
industries - and economic growth, examining data on a group of selected countries 
considered to be rich in such resources. 
The results of this reinvigorated research have called into question the limitation of 
some theoretical assumptions of previous literature. Concretely, this neo-institutionalist 
approach has highlighted the role of institutions in the relation between NR and economic 
performance. Therefore, the resource curse literature has increasingly incorporated neo-
institutionalist elements, pointing to additional implications beyond the pure 
macroeconomic ones previously addressed by DD models. In general, neo-
institutionalists focus on the problems associated with a significant increase in income 
generated from a boom in the resource-intensive sector. Scholars have evidenced the 
spread of rent-seeking behaviors, as well as the worsening in the institutional and 
productive relations, which ultimately affect economic growth (Auty, 2001; Torvik, 
2002). The rentist interpretation shares some theoretical elements with the public choice 
theory: the inadequate management of NR is mainly attributed to the failures of 
governmental intervention, as well as to the effect of collective action of influential 
interest groups (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Hammond, 2011). 
Scholars have also pointed to the association of poor economic performance with the 
presence of authoritarian, corrupted, and predatory governments.4 Van der Ploeg (2010) 
surveyed different hypothesis about the resource curse and considered that ‘rapacious’ 
extraction of rents from ER may help to understand how countries that suffers conflicts 
among different groups stimulates the exploitation of those resources and public 
                                                          
4 The resource abundance has been often found in association with conflicts, civil wars, political instability, 
and State authoritarianism (Ross, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Nonetheless, this issue will not be 
addressed in this work, since our objective is focused on analyzing the links between resource 
abundance and industrialization. For a more detailed analysis on resources and conflict, see Ross (2004). 
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investment in projects with little social return. He suggested strengthening the fiscal rules 
to make the government more responsible on the spending of the resource revenue. 
A line of research investigated whether NR can affect institutional quality, considering 
it as endogenous to resource wealth. Bulte et al. (2005) found empirical evidence that NR 
negatively affects different measures of institutional quality, suggesting that institutional 
reform may be necessary to foster economic growth in resource-rich countries. Most 
recent works on the resource curse have grown out of those views moving toward a less 
deterministic position in which, although institutions remain an important explanatory 
factor, scholars have done an additional step toward investigating which institutions may 
aggravate the alleged curse.  Mehlum et al. (2006) argue that the quality of institutions 
affects the result of NR on aggregate income. Similarly, Robinson et al. (2006) argue that 
countries benefit from a resource boom only when state institutions are accountable. 
Despite further research along that perspective, the evidence has not reached yet a solid 
consensus. Different critics have been raised pointing at the methodology of research as 
well as the conceptual framework adopted in the investigation of resource curse. Among 
them, the often-used concept of institutional quality itself has been challenged 
(Brunnschweiler, 2008).5 Moreover, it must be noted that early literature frequently 
argued around mere correlations of variables, without ultimately explaining the circular 
causation between institutional quality and the abundance of NR.  
For instance, the indicator used by Sachs and Warner (1995) as a proxy for resource 
abundance (the ratio of NR exports to GDP) has been often treated as an endogenous 
variable in the regression models, whereas it is indeed conditioned by those factors which 
affects economic growth, as the institutional framework. On this point, Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte (2006) treated resource dependence as endogenous and found that institutions 
do affect resource dependence even after controlling for resource abundance. They also 
found that resource abundance positively (not negatively) affects institutional quality and 
economic growth.  
Cross-country analysis and panel data techniques are sensitive to the sample period 
and countries; they may not allow controlling for historical and institutional 
characteristics that are correlated with the proxies used for resource abundance. However, 
to overcome some of these shortcomings, Caselli and Michaels (2009) conducted a 
within-country research on a dataset of Brazilian municipalities to investigate the effects 
                                                          
5 For a critical analysis on conceptual discrepancies on the issue, see also: Stijns (2000); Lederman and 
Maloney (2002, 2008); Isham et al. (2003); Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003). 
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of oil abundance. They found that oil discoveries boost municipal royalties and reported 
public spending but local living standards do not improve as much as expected. In another 
within-country study on Zambia copper mining, Lippert (2014) found that an increase in 
local mineral production positively affect the living standards of household in the 
constituencies near the mines; that results is confirmed also for people who are not 
directly involved in the resource extraction. Bhattacharyya and Resosudarno (2015) 
studied a panel dataset covering 26 provinces of Indonesia over the period 1977-2010. 
They found that growth in non-mining sectors significantly reduces poverty and 
inequality, whereas growth in mining sectors seems to have no impact. Furthermore, their 
study shows that growth acceleration (a period of at least four consecutive years of growth 
in GDP per capita) in non-mining sectors decreases poverty and inequality; in contrast, 
the same process in mining sectors intensifies poverty. 
Scholars have been increasingly deepening the research of how the institutional 
framework affects the relation between NR and economic performance. However, it is 
worth highlighting that few case studies have been developed to investigate the 
determinants of the historical evolution of the institutions responsible for the fiscal 
management of resource rents.6 That would allow understanding the historical process of 
formation of the institutional framework and discover the structural reasons behind the 
management structure of NR in a given country. Though neo-institutionalists do pay 
attention to the process of institutional change, the focus on this issue in historical and 
structural terms has been poorly incorporated in. 
 
2.3 Structuralism and Productive Linkages  
In the 1950s, various scholars focused their investigation on the difficulties to foster 
industrial development in primary developing economies, pointing at two fundamental 
problems: (1) the declining tendency of the terms-of-trade relation between primary and 
manufactured products, and (2) the inter-sectorial dismantling of productive structure in 
primary countries in the periphery of global economy. 
                                                          
6 An interesting exception to this is the study by Haber and Menaldo (2011). Using both country-by-country 
time series and panel data with country fixed effects, they studied a panel of 168 countries from 1800 
to 2006. They found that an increase in resource reliance is not associated with authoritarianism over 
the long run. Their result has been partially confirmed (for the period before the 1970s) by Andersen 
and Ross (2014). 
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In separate works, Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) developed the argument of the 
declining terms-of-trade relation affecting primary exporting economies. Their 
proposition addressed the consequences of international division of labor in a global 
capitalist economy, where peripheral regions specialize in the production of primary 
products for export to the industrialized countries of the center. In their view, the unequal 
sharing of the fruits of technical progress generated in the manufacturing of the center 
would have resulted in wage increases relatively higher than the growth of productivity. 
That would have ultimately conduced to a rise in the prices of industrial goods produced 
in the center, and to a consequent decline in real terms-of-trade in the periphery. With 
respect to this issue, Prebisch (1950) also stressed that, though in its view the 
industrialization of the periphery was not an end itself that process would have been 
highly relevant to improve the living standards of people in peripheral economies. The 
key contribution of Latin American structuralists was precisely the incorporation of an 
historical and structural perspective in a center/periphery vision of the exploitation of NR, 
while shedding light on the implications of the global economic structure on the 
institutional framework (Prebisch, 1981).  
Thanks to these contributions, most problems associated with the productive 
dimension of NR exploitation acquired a central relevance; in short, an expansion of 
manufactured production in the periphery (as part of structural change) could have been 
possible only through a domestic capital accumulation. 
From different views, Latin American structuralists also highlighted the problem of 
the poor contribution of the primary sector to stimulate the production in other industries, 
especially the manufacturing. That issue suggests the existence of weak relations between 
an export-oriented resource-intensive sector and the rest of domestic economy. Several 
factors explain why extractive industries tend to be enclave sectors, it being possible to 
differentiate between sector-specific factors and more general factors which tend to be 
present in developing economies. Among the former, we can highlight the strong presence 
of foreign capital, the control of production for export, or the specificity of the required 
technology. Among the latter, we can consider the lack of domestic demand, the 
underdevelopment of the industrial sector, and the low productivity that favors an enclave 
model. Moreover, these poor productive linkages across sectors are also deemed to make 
technology transfer more difficult, exacerbating the already present structural duality in 
productivity across industries in primary developing countries.  
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This model of natural resources exploitation is far from novel, as the historical 
perspective adopted by the structuralist literature shows. The persistence of this model 
(even with changes in many cases, despite the implementation of various developmental 
strategies over the past several decades) shows the magnitude of the challenge to 
overcome the enclave model. 
As discussed, the structuralist perspective addressed the problems to foster 
industrialization from the exploitation of NR in the framework of center/periphery 
relations. In this context, the growing internationalization of production and the role of 
transnational corporations are then taken into consideration to explain the appropriation 
and use of resource rents by foreign companies. Latin American structuralists and 
dependentists interpreted this foreign private extraction of surplus as an obstacle to the 
process of capital accumulation in the periphery, and a factor of deterioration of inter- and 
intra-sectorial relations between an export-oriented primary sector and the domestic 
economy. Moreover, considering the role of transnational companies and influential 
social groups, these scholars evidenced key problems related to the appropriation, 
distribution, and use of resource rents through a different perspective (Furtado, 1968). 
Early scholars, since the pioneering work of Hirschman (1964), focused on linkage 
effects across sectors and paid attention to the difficulties in fostering fiscal, consumption, 
and productive linkages from primary sector. A first problematic issue suggested that 
fiscal linkages would have been an effective mechanism to foster industrial development 
but only when taxes, royalties, and other revenues generated from the exploitation of NR 
are channeled toward productive investments in the economy. Second, in an economy at 
an initial stage of industrialization, the extra-rent generated from primary sector may be 
partially devoted to the consumption of imported industrial products (hence consumption 
linkages may be less effective). Finally, in case of the creation of an enclave between 
primary sector and the rest of the economy, productive linkages may be characterized by 
a relative detachment across sectors. The idea is that a lack of complementarity across 
industries may ultimately affect the expansion of domestic market and industrial 
development. 
To sum up, structuralist view raised the attention on the need for an industrial 
(productive) strategy from NR to overcome the structural dualism of the economy, 
stimulate linkages and face the (alleged) deterioration of terms-of-trade of primary vis-a-
vis manufactured products. As discussed about resource curse literature, it must be noted 
that these arguments have been evolving in recent decades. Since the advent of import 
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substitution industrialization strategies, developing countries have been moving toward 
industrial development initiatives which are not merely based in but launched from the 
exploitation of NR. That is also partially due to the lessons learned from failing attempts 
of some Latin American and African developing countries to imitate the industrial 
development model successfully followed by certain Asian economies (which were 
likewise strongly relying on primary resources). 
 
Table 1. Main problems related with natural resources 
Perspectives Problems Select scholars 
Dutch Disease Macroeconomic 
mechanisms: resource 
movement effect and 
spending effect 
Bruno and Sachs 
(1982); Corden and 
Neary (1982); Corden 
(1984); Krugman 
(1987); Gelb et al. 
(1998) 
Learning by doing and 
human capital 
Van Wijnbergen 
(1984); Kim  (1998); 
Gylfason et al. (1999, 
2001); de Ferranti et 
al. (2002); Wright and 
Czelusta (2002); 
Bravo-Ortega and De 
Gregorio (2005) 
Currency exchange  Caballero and 
Lorenzoni (2007); 
Magud and Sosa 
(2010) 
Resource 
curse 
Rentism  Auty (1994, 2001); 
Leite  and 
Weidmann(1999); 
Tornell and Lane 
(1999); Torvik (2002);  
Institutional quality 
 
Bulte et al. (2005); 
Mehlum et al. (2006); 
Robinson et al. (2006); 
Brunnschweiler 
(2008); Hammond 
(2011); De Rosa and 
Iootty (2012) 
Economic performance Atkinson and 
Hamilton (2003); 
Stevens (2003); 
Leaderman and 
Maloney (2008) 
Declining terms-of-trade 
of primary products and 
Prebisch (1950); 
Singer (1950) 
12 
 
Latin 
American 
structuralism 
 
insertion in global 
economy 
Development of 
industrial linkages and 
productive structure 
Nurkse (1953); 
Hirschman (1964); 
Furtado (1968); 
Prebisch (1981) 
 
3. Conditions to Foster an Industrialization Strategy from Natural Resources 
In Section 2 we identified main problems related with the exploitation of NR. Seeking to 
overcome them, since late 1990s new studies have been oriented to the investigation of 
the conditions under which the exploitation of NR may boost a process of industrialization 
that contributes to economic development. A critical review of prominent works in this 
research area will lead us to identify the key conditions to foster industrial development 
from NR. Our findings will highlight two major dimensions in which the various works 
are specifically focused: (1) a productive dimension fundamentally linked to a neo-
structuralist approach; and (2) a fiscal dimension, often addressed by neo-institutionalist 
and DD literature.  
 
3.1 Productive Dimension 
Traditionally, Latin American structuralism has seen the industrialization as a factor of 
technological progress and a key component of structural change and economic 
development. More recently, Latin American neo-structuralism has gained prominence in 
the debate on industrialization, especially in relation with the strategies related with the 
exploitation of NR. Thus, scholars within that approach have agreed that the key driver 
of a proper exploitation of NR is to achieve the development of backward and forward 
linkages (ECLAC, 2008; UNIDO, 2011). These linkages would be capable to encourage 
the production and export diversification needed to overcome the dualism that often 
characterizes resource-rich economies (ECLAC, 2005). In addition to those from the 
ECLAC, other works have provided evidence that the exploitation of NR may generate 
positive spillovers onto manufacturing through the attraction of investments in new 
capacity and local support (Ritter, 2001; Sæther at al., 2011).  
Forward linkages include the processing, distribution, and marketing of NR; it is in 
these activities that developing countries may tend to advance their industrial 
development. Backward (or upstream) linkages involve the supply of inputs, components, 
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and equipment manufactured by the industry linked to the oil and gas industry (Teka, 
2012). These links are more difficult to achieve than the forward ones, and they are 
therefore considered essential to foster a process of structural change. Furthermore, some 
of these sectors are usually more labor intensive than the primary sector, especially when 
the local supply industry is at incipient stages of development; hence, these activities do 
play a functional role in countries with abundant labor force (Aragón and Rud, 2011). 
Despite the difficulty in achieving such linkages, scholars stressed the need to foster 
productive agglomerations around NR as engines to boost productive linkages (Ramos, 
1999; UNCTAD, 2011). Also, the diversification resulting from the development of these 
linkages may help to reduce the vulnerability to external shocks that has been determinant 
in the economic performance of Venezuela and other oil-rich countries (Hausmann and 
Rodríguez, 2006). 
Many cases that show that, under certain circumstances, it is possible to develop 
those linkages. In Brazil, for example, the inclusion of local content requirements in the 
bidding round encouraged the growth of the offshore supply chain between 1999 and 
2008, generating additional incomes for the national industry worth US$ 21.5 billion and 
875,000 new jobs (Prominp, 2010). 
Pérez (2010) has noted that the development of such linkages may contribute to the 
acquisition of productive and technological capabilities in some sectors that may 
ultimately boost a new technological revolution. The development of new technologies 
and innovations from the exploitation of NR turn out to be key conditions to building 
higher value-added segments in the global value chain. In addition, the diversification of 
manufacturing production based on technological innovation may boost the learning 
process and the training of human resources (Teixeira and Ferraro, 2009; Morris et al., 
2011). In fact, many investment projects to exploit the NR require the development of 
specific technologies, which may foster R&D spending and promote the demand for new 
capabilities. 
If productive linkages are key factors to promote a resource-based industrialization 
strategy, how are these linkages to be achieved? Three elements have emerged as critical: 
(1) a sustained growth of the production of NR, which constitutes the springboard of these 
linkages, (2) an industrial policy that sustain the development of the linkages, and (3) a 
sustained process of capital accumulation in the domestic economy through new 
investments. The presence of a structured industrial base, albeit incipient, significantly 
favors this process whereas the absence of a minimal pre-industrial structure would 
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prevent it. That is precisely the challenge faced today by many developing countries with 
abundant NR. 
From the historical experience of Norway, as well as by some other countries, various 
authors have agreed that State intervention is required to encourage these linkages 
(Machinea and Vera, 2008; UN-ECA, 2011). In this sense, investment in infrastructure 
(physical, technological, and communication) and the inclusion of local content measures 
turn out to be a necessary condition, although sometimes insufficient, for a sound 
exploitation of NR. The empirical evidence has shown that these factors are strategic to 
foster productive linkages (Kuramoto, 2000; Adewuyi and Oyejide, 2012).7 Moreover, 
scholars have emphasized the development potential that can be derived from investments 
in infrastructure at a regional level and have argued in favor of the supranational co-
operation among developing countries (AUC, 2012). 
Notwithstanding, as Ross (2001) pointed out, some factors such as international trade 
barriers hinder the productive linkages described above in developing countries. 
Industrialized countries adopt higher tariffs on processed goods than on the extractive 
products they import from developing countries. 
 
3.2 Fiscal Dimension 
Though neo-structuralist approach seems to respond to some issues related with any 
strategy of industrialization from NR, it does not address all the challenges of insertion in 
international markets faced by primary-exporting countries. Hence, we suggest 
complementing the productive dimension with a fiscal dimension that focuses more 
specifically on the distribution and use of resource rents. Though, as discussed in Section 
2, the exploitation of NR gives rise to frequent problems, our research highlight that they 
do not occur in automatically, nor are they impossible to overcome. Thus, there is an 
increasing consensus on the need for a political and institutional framework that prevents 
the possible de-industrialization associated with inappropriate macroeconomic 
management and poor governance of NR. On that, Norway is often considered a case in 
point in the literature since it showed positive results in terms of industrial development 
from NR (although neo-structuralists and neo-institutionalists tend to emphasize different 
aspects of the Norwegian strategy). 
                                                          
7 Other authors outside ECLAC agree with Kuramoto's conclusions. See: Heum et al. (2003: 54); Morris 
et al. (2011); and Adewuyi and Oyejide (2012). 
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In light of these considerations, we suggest that sound-development policies in 
resource-rich countries must combine two objectives: (1) to make consistent 
macroeconomic and industrial policy through proper management of exchange rates and 
monetary policy, which curb potential currency appreciation, and (2) to ensure the 
efficient use of resource rents in a way to combine both productive and social goals.  
To achieve the first objective, most scholars have suggested allocating the resource 
rents to the creation of ad-hoc reserve funds with specific functions, although we found 
differences among authors on the priority given to them. The creation of such funds may 
contribute to disciplining current public expenditure while adding countercyclical 
financing needed to overcome the adverse effects of volatility. This may also serve to 
stabilize the exchange rate market by regulating currency supply. 
However, close coordination among policymakers in fiscal and monetary policy is 
required, along with a stable institutional framework that clearly regulates the functioning 
of those funds.  
Regarding the second objective proposed above (2), Torvik (2002) and Mehlum et al. 
(2006) have shown that in the case of oil-rich economies, the best performing countries 
were those that devoted the largest share of oil-related rents to productive investment. But 
as Cypher (2010) has stated, rents must also contribute 'to a reduction in income and 
wealth inequality in order to build effective demand for the internal market as well as to 
address the issue of economic justice' (Cypher, 2010: 646).  
Overall, we found a widespread consensus that public expenditure management should 
be part of a prudent fiscal policy (Budina et al., 2006; Gianella, 2007; Lama and Medina, 
2010; Baunsgaard et al., 2012). Some authors have gone further to promote the direct 
distribution of resource rents directly to citizens, with the government then forced to tax 
the distributed rents (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Birdsall and Subramanian, 
2004). However, the empirical evidence is still limited to the case of Alaskan citizens’ 
funds, and it is not clear whether developing countries have the institutional capacity to 
adopt these instruments as Alaska did (Hjort, 2006). 
A key issue is to place the pursuit of the two goals mentioned above in the specific 
context of each economy. Fiscal and social policy, and particularly industry policy, must 
take into account the specific conditions of each economy, especially the factors that hold 
back the diversification of production, even with proper management of revenues toward 
the achievement of both goals. The already mentioned work of Pegg (2010) on Botswana 
is also illustrative of the influence of economic, social, cultural and even geographical 
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local factors that have slowed the diversification of production. Moreover, the 
management of macroeconomic policy is not the only factor influenced by the external 
environment; industry is also conditioned by the dynamics of global and regional markets. 
This requires a recognition of limits on what can be achieved. 
So far, seeking to overcome the problems identified in Section 2, we have discussed 
main issues affecting the use of resource rents, distinguishing between macroeconomic, 
productive, and social purposes. There still remains a crucial aspect to be discussed on 
which there is little consensus in the literature: the government taking on resource rents. 
What kind of governmental appropriation is necessary to achieve the macroeconomic, 
productive, and social objectives outlined above? Should this participation be the same 
regardless of the degree of presence of transnational companies and State-Owned 
Enterprises in the domestic economy? Experiences in this regard are broadly different, 
making it difficult to reach a universal answer. Nevertheless, we have found some 
interesting experiences in the oil and gas industry from which to draw some lessons.  
On one hand, the Norwegian model, usually taken as an example of “good practices” 
in the literature, has been developed with a high degree of government participation in 
resource rents. This experience, together with the deficiencies encountered in some low-
taxing developing countries at the end of the 1990s, has led scholars to emphasize the 
importance and legitimacy of a higher government take. The aim would be to capture 
more rents for re-investment in favor of productive diversification or social programs. 
However, there is evidence that in several countries a higher in-take from national 
government does not necessarily guarantee a good fiscal performance. Indeed, these 
experiences motivate resource curse literature to propose stricter controls on public 
spending.8   
As regards oil and gas industry, the Brazilian case may provide worthwhile elements 
to this discussion. The current model of exploration and exploitation of oil and gas 
reserves in that country has been developed with low government take and has generated 
interesting results in terms of production and processing of resources. However, this low 
                                                          
8 Some publications of the World Bank connect with this approach by emphasizing the need for 
transparency in the management of income and the quality of institutions (Canuto and Giugale, 2010: 
113; Sinnott et al., 2010; De Rosa and Iootty, 2012). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(supported by the Bank World, among others) is an attempt to apply a mod el of ''good governance''. 
However, Colom (2011) in a study of Ghana, emphasizes that though transparency is always desirable, 
there are problems related to the exploitation of NR 'that are not going to be solved only by applying 
more transparency' Colom (2011: 7). According to this author, there are issues having to do with the 
political economy of the country beyond the approach of transparency. 
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public participation is only apparent since Petrobras retains a high percentage of the 
income generated in the exploitation of oil and gas; also, the use of that income is directly 
or indirectly influenced by the federal energy policy. This may explain the sharp rise of 
investments in refining of oil and gas, as well as the strengthening of Petrobras’ policy on 
local suppliers since 2003, coinciding with the industrialization impulse intended by the 
federal government. 
In an empirical research on 74 mineral export-dependent countries, Hinojosa et al. 
(2010) found a positive association between State revenue and social policy and conclude 
that resource rents could be used by the government as a springboard to launch social 
policies devoted to enhance social welfare. However, Weinthal and Jones Long (2006) 
have pointed out that the State´s direct control on resource rents may lead to weak 
regulatory and fiscal institutions. Based on the case of the Russian oil and gas industry, 
the authors have argued that domestic private ownership may foster the incentives for 
both public and private actors to bargain over the establishment of strong institutions. 
Privatization creates clear boundaries between government actors and private owners, 
which impede the discretional use of rents by State elites.  
The World Bank argues that resource extraction and good governance may together 
promote poverty reduction; hence, it would be possible to replicate a good governance 
model that has succeeded in one country within another. However, the evidence from the 
case of Chad-Cameroon pipeline project seems to contradict this argument (Pegg, 2006). 
The World Bank Group partially funded the pipeline and pushed for a model of good 
governance based on monitoring and good practices.9 However, the project suffered 
serious design flaws: the revenue management law allowed the president of Chad to 
modify, by unilateral decree, part of the revenue flow, which was diverted to military 
spending. In short, it seems that simply establishing a model of good governance may not 
ensure a resource-led development strategy. 
In short, the model of management and distribution of resource rents between public 
and private actors should be closely linked to the institutional framework affecting their 
governance. Regardless of the degree of participation of public and private companies, 
on the fiscal dimension this model must ensure compliance of the two aforementioned 
objectives of a sound industrialization strategy. 
                                                          
9 It is worth noting that the World Bank has been pioneer in advocating for a “mining strategy” for Latin 
America and the Caribbean based on good institutions (World Bank, 1996). 
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4. Key Proposals 
The identification of the conditions to be met by an industrialization strategy should be 
based on a proper diagnosis of the obstacles that resource-rich countries have traditionally 
faced. Thus, the first part of this paper has focused on reviewing the literature to identify 
these problems, while the second part has analyzed the contributions that address some 
experiences of industrialization in countries with abundant NR from which we could 
identify the conditions that such a strategy should meet. The answer suggested below is 
intended to contribute to the current debate on the development strategies linked to the 
exploitation of NR but it cannot be regarded as conclusively true or rigidly applicable to 
all countries. On the contrary, it must be interpreted in light of the particularities of each 
economy and its specific development needs (Chang, 2003). 
The article has shared and extended the contribution of other scholars who stressed 
the relevance of domestic policy decisions in determining the impact of the exploitation 
of NR. We argue that sound economic policies should take into account both fiscal and 
productive dimension. Taking into account the findings highlighted in the previous 
sections, we suggest that a resource-based industrialization strategy should be defined by 
four key features. These elements are interrelated and, as it is shown in the table 2, they 
can be grouped into two dimensions, the productive one and the fiscal one, as follows: 
 
• Productive dimension 
1) A sustained increase of production, which will form the material basis of the 
strategy. Such productive expansion is possible only through a concurrent steady 
increase in investments. 
2) The development of the industrial value chain linked to the exploitation of natural 
resources (with backward and forward linkages), thereby correcting a primary 
productive and export pattern.  
• Fiscal dimension 
3) The use and management of resource rents to avoid the Dutch Disease, in 
coordination and complementarity with industrial and macroeconomic policy.  
4) The allocation of resource rents to support social programs those allow a 
redistribution of income and a steady improvement in living conditions. 
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Table 2. Conditions to foster industrial development from natural resources and 
problems to overcome 
Conditions Problems to overcome Select scholars 
Productive 
dimension 
To encourage 
production and export 
diversification to 
overcome the dualism 
Ramos (1998); 
Ritter (2001); 
Kaplinski et al. 
(2011); Sæther et al. 
(2011); ECLAC 
(2005, 2008); UN-
ECA (2011); 
UNIDO (2011) 
 
Diversification may 
help to reduce the 
vulnerability to 
external shocks 
ECLAC (2005); 
Hausmann and 
Rodríguez (2006) 
Acquisition and 
development of 
technological and 
human resources 
capabilities 
Buitelaar (2001); 
ECLAC (2008); 
Peek et al. (2008); 
Teixeira and Ferraro 
(2009); Pérez 
(2010); Morris et al. 
(2011); Teka (2012) 
Fiscal dimension To make consistent 
macroeconomic and 
industrial policy 
through a proper 
management of 
exchange rates and 
monetary policy  
Budina et al. (2006); 
Gianella (2007); 
Lama and Medina 
(2010); Sinnott et al. 
(2010); Baunsgaard 
et al. (2012) 
The use of resource 
rents in a way to 
combine both 
productive and social 
goals 
AUC (2009); 
Cypher (2010); 
Hinojosa et al. 
(2010) 
 
 
The identification of these basic features entails an orderly and consistent assessment 
of the implementation of the strategy, to identify the potential constraints and 
contradictions. However, this does not imply that there is a single policy and a universal 
institutional framework for compliance with the four conditions. The growing literature 
on the governance10 of NR seeks to identify this setting by defining a model of good 
                                                          
10 The use of the term governance is increasingly common in the literature. However, it is not possible to 
identify a broad consensus based on a single definition. For ECLAC (2013), governance of NR is 
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institutions applicable to all countries. The problem with such a generalization is that it 
makes it impossible to identify the conditions that have characterized the different 
historical experiences of many resource-rich countries (Findlay and Lundhal, 1999; 
Feinstein, 2005; Blomström and Kokko, 2007).  
There are differences among scholars on the policy and the institutional factors 
necessary for achieving these conditions. The most important disagreements are found in 
the specification of the measures to implement the policies, and in defining the most 
appropriate ownership structure for promoting the industrialization. Starting with the 
latter, some authors, inheriting a neoliberal view, tend to consider that the exploitation of 
NR is more efficient when it is managed by the private sector (Sinnott et al., 2010). 
However, the empirical evidence is not conclusive on that point (Hertog, 2010), especially 
when the goal is not to reach a more intensive resource exploitation but rather to foster 
the industrialization. There is also little evidence on the benefits of the presence of State-
Owned Enterprises whose performance is strongly influenced by their organizational and 
financial capabilities, as well as by the links with the countries in which they are inserted 
(Paz and Ramírez, 2013).  
These examples suggest that the government may need to play an active role in 
mediating and establishing the institutional framework to enhance its participation in 
order to actively support domestic agriculture and rural small-scale industrialization. 
Hence, State-ownership or State-influence in specific enterprises may be seen as a 
strategic condition to foster industrial development, but only when this gives appropriate 
response to the country-specific structural characteristics. 
Anyhow, whether or not in presence of a strong State-Owned Enterprise, 
transnational corporations are often key players in most regimes of exploitation of NR. 
Therefore, the regulatory framework of their activities should be considered as a strategic 
element to foster the industrial linkages. Not surprisingly, the more recent literature has 
revived the debate on the need to introduce performance requirements to foreign investors 
and local content policies (UNCTAD, 2003; UN-ECA, 2011). 
With regard to industrial policy, neo-structuralists are noted for having a more 
favorable approach to it, as they believe that a development strategy linked to the NR 
should not be limited to a simple macroeconomic management, but it must be involved 
in the productive sphere. This more active role of industrial policy is absent in the neo-
                                                          
understood as a: 'set of sovereign policies of countries related to the ownership of natural resource as 
well as the distribution of productivity gains from its exploitation' (ECLAC 2013: 7). 
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institutionalist approach, as its advocates tend to defend market mechanisms and the 
openness to private investments in the extractive sector. In our opinion, such a view 
ignores the implications of the liberalization according to the historical and structural 
characteristics of each country. Moreover, while the neo-institutionalist approach 
proposed more trade openness (Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2007), an increased external 
openness in the extractive sectors may have contradictory implications with certain 
measures intended to foster the domestic industrial development. 
Finally, it is necessary to incorporate a reflection on the institutions. Although the 
institutional framework is considered a strategic element in all the interpretations we have 
analyzed here, there are significant differences in specifying the necessary institutions to 
sustain the economic policy. Scholars of the DD and the resource curse tend to consider 
that institutional quality is primarily tied to the protection of property rights as well as to 
the transparency and efficiency in the management of NR. The productive activities 
related to the exploitation of NR have been traditionally associated with an institutional 
decay; therefore, one should be wary of the role of government intervention. On the other 
hand, neo-structuralists consider that institutions can be understood only in relation to the 
specific characteristics of the productive structure of a country and its economic and 
social history. This view rejects the notion of a model of “good institutions” as being a 
prerequisite for economic development.  
In sum, these disagreements illustrate what Rodrik (2013) has called the operational 
implications, which can be overcome with different institutional and policy patterns. It is 
only necessary that each model should be consistent with the structural preconditions of 
each country. Two examples relating to the fundamental dimensions outlined in this paper 
can be useful to illustrate our argument. 
First, from a productive perspective, we have noted the usefulness of including local 
content measures to boost linkages between sectors and to overcome the enclave model 
typical of natural resource sectors. Different countries (including Angola, Brazil, 
Indonesia, Nigeria, and Trinidad and Tobago) have incorporated such measures; however, 
these are effective when local capabilities are minimal, and when the measures are 
articulated in coherence with a broader industrial policy (Tordo et. al, 2013; Adewuyi and 
Oyejide, 2012; Teka, 2012). The experience of many countries shows that a set of "easy" 
links can be fostered in low-tech activities, but that the development of medium and high 
technology activities is achieved only when the above conditions are met. Furthermore, 
in certain countries, this can only occur with the arrival of foreign capital, due to the lack 
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of a local business base, and this can reinforce dependency in the development process 
(Evans, 1979). Finally, the importance of purely physical or geological features has been 
sometimes confirmed, such as in the case of Brazil, where a concentration of oil and gas 
reserves in ultra-deep waters has fostered linkages with the naval sector (Paz, 2014). 
Second, from a fiscal perspective, the experience of the Russian Federation is a case 
in point. To face the economic crisis, amendments to the Budget Code of the Russian 
Federation were passed in 2010 to establish that, in 2010-2015, the oil and gas revenues 
of the federal budget would not be used to finance the Reserve Fund and National Wealth 
Fund, but be deployed to finance federal budget expenditures.11 
Therefore, the acquisition of supportive institutions for structural change requires a 
process of experimentation and adaptation over time, which contrasts with a mere 
replication of a universal and static model of “good governance”. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has attempted to identify the main problems associated with the exploitation 
of NR, with a focus on developing countries. We have found that the prominent literature 
addresses the issue from different perspectives, according to a variety of theoretical 
assumptions and conceptual frameworks. Scholars who focus on the DD and the resource 
curse tend to give special attention to the fiscal and macroeconomic aspects that affects 
economic growth. On the other hand, Latin American structuralists and neo-structuralists 
are more concerned with the investigation of the more complex process of structural 
change associated with the exploitation of NR. The empirical evidence seems to highlight 
that the materialization of most of the alleged problems related with NR is not automatic; 
that is, the resource curse is neither inevitable nor irreversible. On the contrary, its 
manifestation is the result of historical economic as well as political and institutional 
factors.  
In coherence with the various problems analyzed, the literature assigns varying 
importance to the different measures that may contribute to fostering a resource-based 
industrialization. Rejecting a dogmatic position in favor of a model “good institutions”, 
scholars coincide that an adequate institutional and political framework to foster industrial 
development structural change vary depending on the distinctive features of each given 
country. Coming from a perspective which attempts to integrate the more fruitful aspects 
                                                          
11 On the functioning of the sovereign wealth funds in Russia see Chevrier (2009). 
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of both neo-institutionalism and Latin American structuralism, we have considered that 
the key issues at stake are essentially two: the industrial policy and the definition of the 
ownership structure of the NR. 
In our opinion, in order to avoid an adherence to failing paradigms, it is necessary to 
go further in deepening into the investigation of case studies, especially at a time when 
the emergence of a new consensus in development economics are redefining the policies 
adopted by developing countries. Case studies may allow for the discovery of the critical 
implications of each of the conditions identified in this paper and help to define an 
industrial development strategy coherent with the necessities and the possibilities of each 
country. As we have shown, a proliferation of case studies has focused on the fiscal 
dimension of natural resource exploitation, whereas industrial development is a 
comparatively under-researched topic. Yet there has been increasing interest in studying 
the effects of local content policies in the oil and gas industry (Tordo et al., 2013). 
However, little attention has been paid to other initiatives promoted by the State to foster 
industrial development based on the exploitation of extractive industries. For instance, in 
the Brazilian oil and gas industry, oil companies are required to invest at least 1% of their 
gross revenue (generated by certain specific oilfields) in oil and gas-related research and 
development (R&D). Up to half of the requirement may fulfilled at the companies’ 
facilities in Brazil, while the rest goes toward funding research projects carried out by 
universities or research institutes. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out some limitations of this paper related with the 
relatively scant attention paid to the field of Ecological Economics, which may be useful 
to define a less “productivist” approach to the exploitation of NR. The ecological 
dimension works cross-wise to the fiscal and the productive dimensions that we have 
identified. Moreover, further research on NR is needed from a gender perspective and the 
consideration of socio-environmental conflicts related with the exploitation of those 
resources.12 
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